We present a network formation model based on a particularly interesting class of networks in social settings, where individuals' positions are determined according to a topic-based or hierarchical taxonomy. In this game-theoretic model, players are located in the leaves of a complete b-ary tree as the seed network with the objective of minimizing their collective distances to others in the network. In the grid-based model of , they demonstrate the existence of small diameter networks with the threshold of α = 2 where the cost of a new link depends on the distance between the two endpoints to the power of α. We show the appearance of small diameter equilibrium networks with the threshold of α = 1/4 in the hierarchical or tree-based networks. Moreover, the general set of equilibrium networks in our model are guaranteed to exist and they are pairwise Nash stable with transfers [2] .
Introduction
The role of network structures in determining the outcome of many social and economic settings has captured increasing attention in recent years. In particular, different researches have demonstrated this significant role in the wide range of problems [4] . As a result, it is crucial to study the formation process of social and economic networks and to know their characteristics, as there is a frequent appearance of certain properties such as small diameter and large clustering coefficient in naturally occurring networks [7] . A growing body of works in strategic or game-theoretic network formation 3 considers the underlying network structure as a set of self-interested individuals and their connections. In a previous effort [3] , Even-Dar and Kearns proposed a model that starts from a √ n × √ n grid network. Players' objective is to minimize their collective distances to all other players. Forming a link is costly at the fixed price of the initial grid distance between the endpoint players of that link to the power of α. Also, equilibrium analysis is relaxed from Nash equilibrium to link stability. Link stability implies that the network is stable under single link unilateral deviations. 4 They showed the appearance of small diameter link stable networks within the threshold of α = 2. Further, Atabati and Farzad [1] expand this result by showing the existence of a small diameter in the general set of equilibrium networks under the new assumption of dynamic link-pricing that better represents the dynamic nature of network formation.
5
Hierarchical networks are known as credible social structures based on observations in social sciences [8] . In particular, previous studies [5, 8] have analyzed the hierarchical networks by applying stochastic models. However, less is known from the strategic perspective. We aim to fill this gap by presenting our game-theoretic hierarchical network formation model. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain our model. We then provide our analysis on the diameter of equilibrium networks in Section 3 and the conclusion in Section 4.
The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of n players being located at the leaves or the lowest level of a complete b-ary tree, denoted by G 0 as the starting or seed network. Typically in these networks, the distance of each two players is defined to be the height of their lowest common ancestor in the tree. 6 Note that in the beginning, there is no additional link between the players in the network and distances are defined by the structure of the tree. Players seek to minimize their collective distances to others in the network. To follow this goal, player i is able to establish links by announcing a vector of transfer payments t i ∈ R n(n−1)/2 . The entry t i jk is i's offer (to pay) or demand (to gain) on the link jk. Direct (indirect) transfer payment is implied when i ∈ jk (i / ∈ jk). Typically, individuals can make offers (positive transfers) for direct and indirect payments, but only can make demands (negative transfers) for direct transfers. In the equilibrium, there is no excess of payments allowed. Thus, a link exists in the equilibrium network, if the summation of all transfers on that link equals zero. Also, G(t) is the resulted network associated with the strategy vector t. Further, network G + ij is obtained by adding a new link ij and G − ij is resulted by removing an existing link ij.
As there will be added links between the leaves of the starting tree network during the game, we need to define the generalized notion of distance between any two players u and v as follows:
, the height of lowest common ancestor of u and v}, where x 1 , . . . , x k are the intermediary players in the shortest path between u and v according to the definition of δ(x i , x i+1 ).
Finally, the utility function of player i in the network G(t) is defined as follows:
where N i denotes the set of i's neighbors, and S i is a subset of i's neighbors whose links to i are initiated by i. Also, p ij = b αd G(t) (i,j) denotes the link-price for the link ij.
7 Link-price is charged to the player who initiates the link formation for each link. Moreover, c ij , as it is introduced in [1] , illustrates the fixed maintenance cost of link ij in which both i and j should consider this charge for maintaining their links at each of point of analysis during the game. In addition, the process of network formation is defined in terms of improving paths.
8 Pairwise stability with transfers is used as the equilibrium 7 This price structure is inspired by the Kleinberg's stochastic model [5] , where he provides a probability function for creating a link ij that grows asymptotically as b −αd G (i,j) . 8 It represents a sequence of changes from one network to another. The changes can emerge when individuals create or sever one link based on the improvement relative to the current notion in our model. A network G(t) is Pairwise Stable with transfers (P S t ),
3 Threshold of α = 1/4
Proposition 3.1 introduces the domain of α that is the main interest in our model, as it is the necessary condition for the process of network formation to evolve. The proof of Proposition 3.1 is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3.1 If 0 < α < 1, the seed network cannot be in equilibrium. Proof. Frist, we introduce the two sets S |S
Because of the distance structure in the hierarchical networks, we need to allocate a set T u ,w to u for several vertices like w such that w ∈ W u in order to construct an upper bound for n.
Players such as w have different distances in the range of [2, ∆] from u . In addition, we can point out that by creating a link from u to w all players with distance of at most x = d G (u ,w) 2 − 1 from w participate in the benefit of this network. 9 The participation of these players implies that creating a link from i to j decreases their distances to i.
linkage. This is because,
Also, after creation the link u w, by considering the closest possible player w to player u , it can be implied that 1 + x < d G (u , w) − x. According to the structure of the seed tree,
is a lower bound for the number of players whose distances to u are decreased by creation of link u w. Consequently, it can be implied that if we repeat this enumeration "k" times for every such player u , we can build an upper bound for the term |T u ,W u |. This upper bound is k|T Note that we consider an upper bound of c for both maintenance costs and direct transfer payments 11 in the following inequality.
where f i is the fraction of players with one the above-mentioned possibilities in the reduced distances. Also, f 1 + f 2 + f 3 = 1, and 0 < f i < 1. As a result, we can rewrite the Inequality 2 as follows:
Assuming the maximum possible diameter (∆), the magnitude of left hand side of Inequality 4 is n 2α+1/2 . Hence, given a sufficiently large size n and if α ≤ 1/4, any distance bigger than f 1 +2f 2 +3f 3 clearly contradicts Inequality 4. As a result, the largest value the diameter can take is 2. 
Conclusion
In this hierarchical network formation model, we show the appearance of small diameter pairwise stable networks with the threshold of α = 1/4. We can also go further and show that the set of pairwise stable networks in our model coincides with the broader set of pairwise Nash stable networks with transfers [2] . In addition, the convergence of our model to equilibrium is guaranteed, since the existence of cycles is ruled out. 
